A relevant joke comes to mind. It was often said of the old Soviet Union that it had no freedom of speech. This is a complete myth. The truth is there was absolutely freedom of speech. Freedom after speech, well that's another story.

To the point of the question, the entire notion of a super-injunction is based on the premise that irreparable damage would be caused to someone if the very language of an injunction was to get out. This makes a valid reason for there to be such a legal entity.

However, two questions must then be assessed by the judge being asked to provide said super-injunction. First, is there sufficient reason to believe that revelation of the wording of the initial injunction would indeed be so injurious to the protected entity (individual or company) that a super-injunction need be considered. Second, is the damage the protected entity is seeking to prevent so great that it should trump the public's right to know.

In the example described in Brooker's article, if there is no reasonable doubt as to whether or not the multi-national actually did what is alleged, that company's right to protect its reputation is minimal, as it has done the damage itself, by the alleged toxic dumping. In such a case the obvious answer is that the public's right to know trumps the company's right to keep its dirty laundry limited to the locations of the toxic dump and the ill-health of the affected individuals.

On the other hand, if there is still doubt as to whether any toxic dumping has occurred, and if it has, what entity is responsible, it would be reasonable to issue such a super-injunction, as the company should be able to protect its reputation if it has not done anything wrong. After all, the right of free speech should not be abused and twisted just to protect slander or libel.
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